The Trademark Protection Of Advertising Slogans: A Modern Perspective by Grover, Evynne
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 1 Volume I 
Number 2 Volume I Book 2 Article 5 
1991 
The Trademark Protection Of Advertising Slogans: A Modern 
Perspective 
Evynne Grover 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Evynne Grover, The Trademark Protection Of Advertising Slogans: A Modern Perspective, 1 Fordham 
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 213 (1991). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol1/iss2/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
THE TRADEMARK PROTECTION OF
ADVERTISING SLOGANS: A MODERN
PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
Commentators define the term "slogan" as a group of words1 or a
catch phrase used mainly in advertising and promotion.2 Manufac-
turers or their advertising agencies design a slogan to coax con-
sumers to purchase goods.' A trademark, by comparison, is a name
or symbol used to identify and distinguish goods and to indicate the
source of the goods.4 Since advertising slogans are not intention-
ally created to function as trademarks, manufacturers or their adver-
tising agencies have inherent difficulty getting trademark protection
for slogans. s
The Lanham Act permits registration of slogans that function as
trademarks.6 A slogan functions as a trademark if the slogan identi-
fies and distinguishes the goods and indicates its source, or if the
slogan is capable of doing so.7 A mark's distinctiveness turns on
the degree of recognition of the mark in the minds of the relevant
customer class.8 Courts and the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") should consistently give advertising slogans the same pro-
tections usually afforded other marks.9 Historically, however, this
has not been the case.10 Numerous courts and even the PTO, had,
in the past, misconstrued the proper standards and or relied on im-
proper factors when they considered whether a slogan was worthy
of trademark protection or registration. 1 In 1966, Martin J. Beran
wrote, "there is still a tendency on the part of the Patent Office to
© 1991 Evynne Grover
1. See Ex parte American Enka Corporation, 81 U.S.P.Q. 476, 479 (Comm'r
Pat. 1949).
2. 2 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR CobpzrioN AND TRADE-MARS 147 (2d ed. 1950).
3. Id. at 149.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
5. CALjui, supra note 2, at 147-49, see S. Lefkowitz, I Remember It Well-I
Think!, 79 TIDimzmuc REp. 395, 405 (1989).
6. 1 J.T. McCA~Rrr, TR.,Enw AND UNF JU R CobwariTioN § 7:5, 188 (2d ed.
1990).
7. 1 J.T. McCAuiRT, supra note 6, at § 7:5, 191-92.
8. Id. § 11:1, at 433.
9. Id. § 7:5, at 188-92.
10. See, e.g., Derenberg, The Lanham Trademark Act of 1946: Practical Effects
and Experiences After One Year's Administration, 38 TRADiamm REP. 831, 835-6
(1948). "Such common phrases and terminology do not rise to the dignity of a
trademark under section 2 of the new Act." Id., infra, Part II. See, e.g., Lefkowitz,
supra, note 5, at 405.
11. See, Lunsford, Distinctive Packages And Slogans Are Registrable On The
Principal Register, 45 TRADEJAz REP. 1131, 1132 (1955).
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treat slogans as 'second class trademarks', scrutinizing them some-
what more strictly, than non-slogan trademarks.... 12
Mr. Beran enumerated three stages of development in the evolu-
tion of slogans under the Lanham Act.' 3 Initially, the Lanham Act,
as a matter of law did not permit registration of slogans. 4 In the
second stage, the Lanham Act permitted registration of slogans on
the principal register, but the PTO was cautious and placed a very
heavy burden upon the slogan owner to prove his right to registra-
tion.' s In the third stage, the courts and the PTO put less emphasis
upon the differences between slogan trademarks and non-slogan
trademarks when they determined registrability of slogans. 16 Mr.
Beran, however, predicted that, "the time is rapidly approaching
when slogans will be considered, in actuality, on a par with non-
slogan marks for purposes of registration in the United States Patent
Office."' 17  We are now in the fourth and final stage of slogc-n
evolution under the Lanham Act. As Mr. Beran correctly predicted
twenty-five years ago, the courts and the PTO no longer differentiate
between slogans and non-slogan trademarks.
This note explores court and PTO opinions and their gradual
award of trademark registration and protection under the Lanham
Act to slogans. Part I discusses the Lanham Act, including how
marks receive trademark protection, the proper factors to be consid-
ered, and the modem constructi6n of the Lanham Act. Part II ex-
amines the cautious approach the courts and the PTO took in
awarding trademark registration and protection to slogans during
the first three stages of slogan trademark evolution under the Lan-
ham Act. Part III explores the fourth and final stage of evolution-
the modem liberal view that guided courts and the PTO to finally
grant slogans the same status as conventional marks.
PART I
LANHAM ACT
REGISTRATION OF TRADEMARKS
In 1946, Congress passed the Lanham Act.' 8 The Act permits
12. Beran, Protection of Slogans in the Patent Office and the Courts, 57 TaDWZ-
MARK REP. 219, 224 (1967).
13. Id. at 239.
14. Id. at 239-40.
15. Id. at 240. Some legislators have feared that the registration of too many
advertising slogans could clog the trademark registers because most slogans have
short life spans. Taylor, Loss of Trademark Rights Through Nonuse: A Comparative
Worldwide Analysis, 80 Tw.zmAx Rzp. 197 (1990).
16. Beran, supra note 12, at 240.
17. Id. at 242.
18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127; The Lanham Act is also known as the Trade-
mark Act of 1946. Id.
Trademark Protection of Slogans
registration of marks which distinguish the goods of the applicant
from the goods of others on the "principal register" '19 and permits
registration of marks which are capable of distinguishing the appli-
cant's goods from those of others on the "supplemental register."
2 °
Registration on the principal register provides very strong protec-
tion to the applicant.21 Such registration is prima facie evidence of
ownership of the mark and of the exclusive right to use the mark.
22
It also gives constructive notice of the claim of ownership 23 and may
be used to stop importation into the United States of goods bearing
an infringing mark. 24 The mark becomes incontestable after five
years on the principal register.2 5
Marks registered on the supplemental register do not receive any
of the aforementioned benefits, although, there are some advan-
tages.2 6 First, federal courts will automatically exercise jurisdiction
over an infringement claim and will dispense with the amount in
controversy requirement.27 Second, the PTO publishes the mark in
the Official Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Office. Attorneys
use this publication as a source when they perform a preliminary
trademark search. Thus, registration on the supplemental register
gives informal notice to potential infringers that someone else is al-
ready using that mark.2" Third, the PTO may cite the applicant's
registered mark against the application of a second applicant who
attempts to register a substantially similar mark, even if the second
applicant files for the principal register.
-2 9
A mark must be- either "inherently distinctive" or must have al-
ready acquired "secondary meaning" to be registrable on the prin-
cipal register.3" "Inherently distinctive" marks are deemed
distinctive in the minds of consumers as soon as they are adopted
and used.3 ' Three types of marks are inherently distinctive: "fanci-
ful," "arbitrary," and "suggestive" marks.
312
19. See id. at 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
20. Id. § 1091.
21. See supra note 6, § 19:5, at 883-84.
22. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1057.
23. 1 J.T. McCmriy, supra note 6, § 19:5, at 883-84; 15 U.S.C. § 1072 .
24. 1 J.T. McCmjunw, supra note 6, § 19:5, at 884.
25. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1065.
26. 1 J.T. McCARmry, supra note 6, § 19:8, at 887-88; see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1065.
27. 1 J.T. McCinrH', supra note 6, § 19:8, at 888.
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1092.
29. 1 J.T. McCArrHv, supra note 6, § 19:8, at 888. These three benefits also
apply to the principal register. Id. § 19:5, at 883-84.
30. Id. § 19:5, at 884; § 11:1, at 433; § 11:18, at 482; 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
31. 1 J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 6, § 15:1, at 656. " '[Ilnherently distinctive'
words and symbols need no proof of distinctiveness." (footnote omitted) Id. § 11:1,
at 433.
32. Id. § 11:1, at 433.
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First, "fanciful" marks are coined words consisting of new and
unique combinations of letters that are totally unfamiliar to consum-
ers, which are invented expressly to function as trademarks.3 3 Ko-
dak, Sanka, and Exxon serve as examples of fanciful trademarks. 3 4
Second, "'[a]rbitrary' marks are common words in everyday use
that, when used as trademark[s], bear no relationship to the prod-
uct."'35 The common word or words "[d]o not describe the product,
nor indicate use, or suggest a specific quality."3 6  Camel ciga-
rettes and Arrow shirts exemplify arbitrary marks.3 7 Third, "sugges-
tive" marks lead the consumer to envision the characteristics or
attributes of the goods without actually describing them.3 8 For ex-
ample, "Coppertone" suntan oil suggests the effect the product has
on the user's skin and "Halo" shampoo suggests an attribute of the
hair after use of the product.3 9 Often the line drawn between arbi-
trary marks and suggestive marks is a fine one.4 0 Courts, howevcr,
have little legal reason to distinguish between suggestive and arbi-
trary marks because both are registrable without further proof of
distinctiveness.' 1
The fourth type of mark registrable on the principal register is a
"descriptive" mark which has acquired "secondary meaning.' 4 2 A
"descriptive" mark describes a particular use, size, class of user, in.
gredient, characteristic, 43 or function of a product to one who is un-
familiar with that product." The Lanham Act does not award the
strong protection of registration on the principal register to marks
which are "merely descriptive"'4 because competitive sellers need
to use them to describe their goods.4 6 "Secondary meaning" is an-
other way of saying that a mark "has become distinctive" under sec-
tion 2(f) of the Lanham Act. 47  A descriptive mark acquires
"secondary meaning" when the buyer associates the mark with a
particular product or service, in addition to its primary meaning.48
33. Id. § 11:2, at 435-36; J. OATou'r, TwmwaAmm 42 (1981).
34. 1 J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 6, § 11:2, at 438; J. OATmoUl, supra note 33,
at 42-43.
35. 1 J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 6, § 11:4, at 439; J. OATHour, supra note 33,
at 43.
36. Id.
37. J. OA.TouTr, supra note 33, at 43.
38. See id. at 43-44.
39. Id. at 44.
40. 1 J.T. McCARTHY supra note 6, § 11:4, at 440.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 11:18, at 482.
43. J. OATHOUT, supra note 33, at 44.
44. 1 J.T. MCCARnrY, supra note 6, § 11:6, at 446.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1988).
46. See 1 J.T. McCARnrY, supra note 6, § 11:21, at 493.
47. See supra note 27; see infra note 55 and accompanying text.
48. J. Oathout, supra note 33, at 44.
Trademark Protection of Slogans
The mark must denote only one seller or source when the buyer
hears the mark.4 9 "Holiday Inn" hotel and "Pocket Books" paper
back books are examples of descriptive marks that have acquired
secondary meaning, i.e., have become distinctive."0
Even if a descriptive slogan is registered, the registrant is not the
absolute owner of all words and phrases within the slogan. The fair
use doctrine provides a statutory defense to a trademark infringe-
ment claim when a party uses an element (i.e. a word or phrase) of
another party's trademark, and the element is used in good faith to
describe to users the first party's goods or services.51
A cursory analysis of the Lanham Act shows that slogans ought to
be registrable on the principal register in the same manner as con-
ventional marks.5 2 Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act states:
[No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be dis-
tinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration
on the principal register on account of its nature unless it... (e)
consists of a mark which, (1) when used on or in connection with
the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive... of them.53
Section 45 of the Lanham Act states "[t]he term 'trademark' in-
cludes any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination
thereof" and that "[wiords used in the singular include the plural
and vice versa."5 4 Since slogans are combinations of words, they
fall squarely within the language of the Lanham Act; therefore, the
courts and the PTO should affirmatively recognize them as trade-
marks.55 Courts and the PTO should permit slogans on the principal
register if the slogans are not merely descriptive, as is the case with
respect to all other marks, and should not subject slogans to any
additional analyses.5 6 Section 23 of the Lanham Act expressly per-
mits registration of slogans on the supplemental register5 7 if the slo-
gans are capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods and are not
registrable on the principal register.5 8
49. 1 J.T. MCCARTHY, § 11:9, at 453-54.
50. J. OATmouTr, supra note 33, at 44.
51. United States Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding defendant's fair use of the phrase "feels like a sneaker" in com-
petetive advertising not an infringement of plaintiff's trademarked slogan "LOOKS
LIKE A PUMP, FEELS LIKE A SNEAKER"); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1982).
52. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1988).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
55. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1091(c) (Supp. 1990).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (Supp. 1990).
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Part II
THE COURTS AND THE PTO AWARD SLOGANS
LESS PROTECTION THAN OTHER
MARKS UNDER THE LANHAM
ACT
The courts and the PTO tended to give less regard to slogans than
to other marks during the first three stages of development of slo-
gans under the Lanham Act.5 9 This attitude may stem from the al-
most total lack of protection of slogans under the Trademark Act of
1905.80 The Trademark Act of 1905 did not generally permit regis-
tration of slogans. 6' Rather, the 1905 Act only permitted registra-
tion of fanciful and arbitrary marks.62 The PTO viewed slogans as
mere advertising creations that consisted of multiple words, and
were rarely persuaded that a slogan, on its own, identified and dis-
tinguished goods.6 3 In fact, the PTO reasoned that because a slo-
gan's purpose was to persuade consumers to purchase a particular
product, that it was an entity completely different from a trademark
and was, therefore, not registrable as a trademark. 6 4 The PTO con-
strued the 1905 Act so strictly, that even if an advertising slogan
aquired secondary meaning, the PTO refused registration of the slo-
gan.6 5 Early courts opined that slogans were inferior to non-slogan
marks and were incapable of distinguishing goods.66
59. See Beran, supra note 12, at 239-40.
60. See Lefkowitz, supra note 5, at 405; 3 R. CALUM, TRADmmm AND UNFAm
CoaUwrrrnoN 1268-69 (2d ed. 1950) (explaining that slogans that were inherently
distinctive or that acquired secondary meaning would be protected on the theory of
unfair competition, rather than on the theory of trademark infringement).
61. Lefkowitz, supra note 5, at 422-23. A descriptive slogan was registrable
under the 1905 Act only if it fit the "10 Year Proviso." 2 NMs, UNFAIm COMPETION
,eTRnnADmxS 229, at 778 (4th ed. 1947). Satisfaction of the "10 Year Proviso"
required the mark be actually and exclusively used in commerce for a period of ten
years. Lefkowitz supra note 5, at 401. Satisfaction of the "10 Year Proviso" is
comparable to secondary meaning. Id. at 401-02. "A resort to the '10 Year Pro-
viso' was almost impossible" because the PTO considered slogans to be mere crea-
tures of advertising and were reluctant to hold slogans to be distinctive of the
goods separate and apart from the word mark. Id. at 405.
62. Lefkowitz, supra note 5, at 399; 1 J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 6, § 5:3 at
137. See also 2 NIms, supra note 63, § 229(a) at 776.-
63. Lefkowitz, supra note 5, at 405.
64. Id. at 422-23.
65. See, e.g., In re Dolly Varden Chocolate Co., 2 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1924)
(refusing registration of slogan "WHEN WORDS FAIL-SEND" for candy company).
See also 3 CzLU", supra note 60.
66. See, e.g., Burmel Handkerchief Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 127 F.2d
318, 321 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (refusing registration of "HANDKERCHIEF OF THE
YEAR" which had been used extensively for handkerchiefs).
Trademark Protection of Slogans
STAGE ONE
THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT PERMIT THE
REGISTRATION OF SLOGANS ON THE
PRINCIPAL REGISTER
Even after Congress passed the Lanham Act, the courts and the
PTO remained skeptical of the validity of slogans as trademarks.67
Both bodies strictly construed the Lanham Act, and determined that
slogans were not registrable on the principal register.6" The Lan-
ham Act expressly defines a slogan as a mark registrable on the sup-
plemental register, 9 yet the definition of marks registrable on the
principal register does not expressly include slogans.7" The courts
and the PTO viewed this omission as an implied exclusion of slogans
from the definition of marks registrable on the principal register.71
STAGE TWO
SLOGANS ARE REGISTRABLE ON THE
PRINCIPAL REGISTER, BUT ARE
JUDGED WITH CAUTIOUS
SCRUTINY
Somewhat of a turning point occurred in 1952. The District Court
of the District of Columbia held that "certain combinations of works,
albeit that they are also slogans, may properly function as trade-
marks." The District Court overruled the Commissioner of the PTO
and granted registration on the principal register for the slogan
"THE FATE OF A FABRIC HANGS BY A THREAD. ' 72  The PTO
67. Lefkowitz, supra note 5, at 423.
68. See id.; See also Exparte Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 97 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 462
(1953); Exparte Chicago Roller Skate Co., 86 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176 (1950) (refus-
ing registration of "FOR HEALTH'S SAKE*ROLLER SKATE"); Er parte William
Skinner & Sons, 82 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 315 (1949) (refusing registration of "LOOK
FOR THE NAME IN THE SELVAGE" where applicant claimed extensive use for
over fifty years); Er parte Booth Bottling Co., Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78 (1949)
(refusing registration of the slogan "5 FULL GLASSES IN EVERY BOTTLE" for soft
drinks, even though applicant used slogan extensively, because slogan only indi-
cated quantity and was not capable of distinguishing goods).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1091(c) (1988).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988).
71. Robert Hall Clothes, 97 U.S.P.Q (BNA) at 464-65 (refusing registration of
"WHY PAY FOR OVERHEAD WHEN YOU CAN'T WEAR IT" for company that
sold clothing). The omission of slogans as a type of mark registrable on the princi-
pal register, "seem[ed] to indicate an intention to confine the registration of slogans
used on goods to the Supplemental Register." Id. at 464. One commentator criti-
cized the inconsistency of this construction, arguing that since registration is.
granted on the supplemental register if the mark is capable of distinguishing goods,
"the next step ... is the realization of such capability," warranting registration on
the principal register. Beran, supra note 12, at 223.
72. American Enka Corp. v. Marzall, 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 111, 112 (D.D.C.
1952). American Enka Corp. filed an application for a composite mark for rayon
1991]
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examiner and the Commissioner both initially refused registration of
the mark because the slogan was merely laudatory and incapable of
indicating the source of the goods.7 3 The District Court, however,
found the slogan to be an arbitrary mark,7 ' and thus, inherently dis-
tinctive for registration purposes on the principal register.
Although this decision established a precedent upon which fu-
ture decisions could be based," some courts distinguished it on the
ground that the slogan was part of a composite mark 76 and contin-
ued to neglect the validity of slogans as trademarks registrable on
the principal register.77 For example, the Examiner refused regis-
tration on the supplemental register of the slogan "USEFUL NEWS
FOR IMPORTANT PEOPLE" as a service mark for advertising space
in a periodical because the slogan was "trite and unimaginative."17 8
The Examiner held the phrase to be a merely factual statment inher-
ently incapable of distinguishing any service, but did not include a
discussion of descriptiveness in his rejection.79 Rather, the Exam-
iner explained that a slogan required some "ingenuity in its phrase-
ology or in its application ot the goods" and needed to "say
something a little different from what might be expected."8 0
yarns. The slogan was below the phrase "fashion approved" and was above a
circle on a black rectangular tag. Id.; see also Wehringer, Slogans-Tests as
Trademarks, 42 J. PAT. On'. Soc'v 781, 782 (1960); see also Beran, supra note 12,
at 222-23.
73. American Enka, 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 112.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Erparte Gulf States Paper Corp., 101 U.S.P.Q. 464 (Comm'r Pat.
1954) (permitting registration of "QUALITY COUNTS" on principal register based
on evidence of acquired secondary meaning via continuous use for almost fifty
years.). The Commissioner posed the question: "[What does... [the slogan] mean
to purchasers?" The Commissioner answered it stating: "whatever its original signi-
fication [sic] may have been, and whatever its present general significance may be,
when 'QUALITY COUNTS' appears on wrapping paper and paper bags, it means a
product manufactured and sold by this applicant." Id. at 465. The Commissioner
also mentioned that the slogan was "a terse phrase which suggests that applicant's
products are quality products." Id. Although the basis for the decision was distinc-
tiveness aquired via secondary meaning, this implies the Commissioner also
thought the slogan was a suggestive, inherently distinctive mark. See Beran, supra
note 12, at 229.
76. A composite mark is a combination of two or more elements that are consid-
ered as one entitiy. Even if the elements are descriptive, the combination as a
whole may be nondescriptive. 1 J.T. McCAflTHY, supra note 6, § 11:10 at 457. Sec-
tion 6 of the Lanham Act permits the Commissioner to require that an applicant
disclaim his rights in descriptive portions of composite marks. Id. at 459.
77. See Exparte Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 97 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 462, 464 (1953);
see also Exparte B.F. Goodrich Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 148, (Comm'r Pat. 1952)
(refusing registration of "BEST IN THE LONG RUN" for tires).
78. Er parte The United States News Publishing Co., 99 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 322
(1953).
79. Id. at 323.
80. Id. at 323-24. The Examiner believed a slogan's distinctiveness turned on
its creativity.
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The true shift in slogan opinions occurred in 19551 when the
Commissioner permitted registration on the principal register of the
slogan "MOVING AIR IS OUR BUSINESS" based upon evidence of
acquired distinctiveness for a company that made electric fans that
circulated air.8 2 Without regard for the slogan nature of the mark,
the Commissioner simply questioned whether the mark distin-
guished the applicant's goods from those of others.8 3
Note, however, that at this stage, the courts tended to award pro-
tection only to marks that aquired secondary meaning and did not
acknowledge the possibility that a slogan could be inherently dis-
tinctive.8 4 For example, the Commissioner granted registration on
the principal register for the slogan "TOPS FOR GOOD DRINKS"
in 1956 for bottle caps.8s The Commissioner found the slogan had
a "dual connotation, or double entendre"8 6 and that the industrial
purchasers at whom the slogan was aimed would "recognize the
phrase as indicating origin."8" As evidence of secondary meaning,
the applicant submitted letters from beverage bottlers who insisted
that the slogan "unequivocally" indicated the applicant as the
source.
88
The Board also noted the double entendre in the slogan "NO
BONES ABOUT IT" for the applicant's boneless ham when it
granted registration of the slogan on the principal register based on
evidence of secondary meaning.8 9 The evidence indicated the ham
81. See Beran, supra note 12, at 229-30; see also Derenberg, The Eighth Year
of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 45 TRADiUM REP. 987,
1008 (1955); W. Derenberg, The Eleventh Year of Administration of the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946, 48 TaA R REP. 1037, 1039 (1958); Lunsford, supra
note 11, at 1134.
82. Ex parte Robbins & Myers, Inc., 104 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 403 (Comm'r Pat.
1955); see also Beran, supra note 12, at 230.
83. Ex parte Robbins, 104 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 403.
84. Derenberg, 48 TAwEMmARK REP. at 1039; see 101 U.S.P.Q. at 465. Although
the Commisioner alluded to the possible suggestiveness of the slogan "QUALITY
COUNTS," he based his decision upon secondary meaning in the minds of consum-
ers. See Ex parte Redmond Company, Inc., 117 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 484 (Comm'r Pat.
1958)'(permitting registration on principal register for "THE BIG NAME IN SMALL
MOTORS" for electric motors where evidence slogan had been so widely adver-
tised that it became synonymous with applicant's goods and actually identified
goods.).
85. Ex parte W.H. Hutchinson & Son, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 244 (Comm'r
Pat. 1956).
86. "TOPS"could describe the actual bottle caps (bottle tops) for drinks or the
high quality of the"bottle caps.
87. 111 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 244.
88. Id.
89. In re National Tea Co., 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 286, 287 (T.T.A.B. 1965) ("The
... [slogan]... has a double connotation or significance as applied to hams which
well might attract the attention of a prospective customer." Id.); see Beran, supra
note 12, at 231-32.
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had been sold widely and extensively throughout many states for
three years with the slogan prominently displayed on its label.9"
STAGE THREE
SLOGANS ARE REGISTRABLE ON THE
PRINCIPAL REGISTER, OFTEN IN A
MANNER COMPARABLE TO
NON-SLOGAN MARKS
In the third stage, the heavy burden of proving secondary mean-
ing began to shift from the applicant to the PTO or the party oppos-
ing registration. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA)91 started its trend of granting registration on the principal
register unless evidence indicated the slogan was not registrable.
The CCPA held that if a slogan is "capable of functioning as a
trademark... [then] registration is mandatory unless it is prohibited
for one of the reasons expressly set forth in Section 2 of the Lanham
Act."92 The court also noted that a slogan is a "combination of
words that fits the definition of a trademark under Section 45 of the
Lanham Act.93 The court granted registration of the slogan "USE
ME NEXT-I'M READY FOR SERVICE" for wire cloth, because the
slogan was capable of functioning as a trademark and neither the
Board nor the Examiner (both of whom the court overruled) ques-
tioned the distinctiveness of the slogan. Rather, the Board and the
Examiner pointed only to the inability of the slogan to function as a
trademark. 94 The court mentioned that the Board or Examiner may
have questioned a lack of secondary meaning, but, if so, did not
state it clearly enough for secondary meaning to be an issue on ap-
peal.95 This decision did not cause a drastic change in the way slo-
gan cases were decided. Some courts may have viewed this
opinion as overbroad and, thus, did adopt its heretofore most lib-
eral Lanham Act construction.9"
This liberal view did become a trend a few years later.97 The
90. Id. at 287.
91. In 1982, this court Was succeeded by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.
92. In re Wisconsin Wire Works, 291 F.2d 958, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (emphasis
added).
93.Id.
94. Id. at 958-59.
95. Id. at 958.
96. But see In re Burger King of Florida, Inc., 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 396
(T.T.A.B. 1963) (permitting registration of slogan "HOME OF THE WHOPPER" for
drive-in restaurant services).
97. But see In re Kenner Products Co., 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 360 (T.T.A.B. 1967)
(refusing registration on principal register of slogan "BABY'S FIRST PLAYTHING"
for hanging crib mobile toy). The Board held "there is not one scintilla of imagina-
tion or ingenuity in its phraseology" even though exclusive and continuous use for
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Board held in In re David Crystal, Inc., the slogan "SPORTSWEAR
FOR EVERYWEAR" was an inherently distinctive mark and was reg-
istrable on the principal register.98 The Board noted the double en-
tendre of the slogan as well as its alliteration.9 9 The key
determination, however, was in the Board's liberal construction of
the Lanham Act. The Board reversed the Examiner, who character-
ized the mark as "a trite combination of words in the nature of an
advertising slogan... [which did] not appear to be capable of dis-
tinguishing applicant's goods from those of others," on a finding
that the slogan fit Section 2 of the Lanham Act. 100 The slogan was
used as a primary means of identification for the goods, so it was not
"merely descriptive... [nor] incapable of distinguishing applicant's
goods" from the goods of others.' 0 1
The Board also held the slogan "FROM MAINE'S COOL BREEZE
TO THE FLORIDA KEYS" to be inherently distinctive of applicant's
moving and storage services.10 2 The Examiner denied registration
based on the literal meaning of the slogan, which described the
place to which the applicant would move a customer. The Board,
however, noted that since the applicant was not confined to such a
narrow job description, the slogan was not descriptive. Further-
more, the Board viewed the slogan as suggestive of applicant's serv-
ices.1 0 3 This decision seems to be an even further shift away from
the prior burden placed upon the applicant to prove his worthiness
of protection for his slogan.10 4
The CCPA permitted registration of the slogan "YOU CAN
LOOK UP TO PREFORMED" for pole line hardware used in the
electrical trade.' 0 s The Board denied registration because the
large-lettered word PREFORMED dominated the rest of the phrase,
five years was evinced. The Board also claimed the slogan was factual information
about the product that competitors had an equal right to use. Id. at 361.
98. In re David Crystal, Inc., 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 95 (T.T.A.B. 1965).
99. Id. at 95. "Mhe mark possesses a double entendre in suggesting that appli-
cant's suits and dresses can either be worn any place or for a variety of different
occasions." Id.
100. Id. at 95-96.
101. Id. at 95. Applicant submitted specimens of hang tags from applicant's
dresses which bore the slogan to show applicant used the slogan to identify the
goods. Id.
102. In re Lincoln Park Van Lines, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 313 (T.T.A.B. 1966).
103. Id. (i.e., the slogan suggested the applicant's capability of moving people
long distances and their availability for service beyond a locality.).
104. The-Board reiterated the applicant's claim that the slogan was poetical or
allegorical. Apparently, however, the Board also found the slogan suggestive with-
out regard to such factors that might have been necessary in prior years to get
registration. "True, the mark comprises bad poetry but nevertheless it is suggestive
in connotation rather than .descriptive." Id.
105. In re Preformed Line Prods., Co., 359 F.2d 907 (C.C.P.A. 1966) Slogan
had been in use for five years.
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which consisted of much smaller letters, and because the word PRE-
FORMED alone had already been denied registration for its inabil-
ity to distinguish goods. 10 6 The court's concise opinion flatly stated
that the slogan as a whole identified and distinguished applicant's
goods. There was no reference to acquisition of secondary meaning
and no reference to specific facts indicating why or how the slogan
funtioned as a trademark. 10 7 This case seems to be the entry into
stage four.
PART III
STAGE FOUR
THE LANHAM ACT PROTECTS
SLOGANS AS TRADEMARKS SUBJECT TO THE SAME
SCRUTINY AS NON-SLOGAN MARKS
The fourth and final stage in the evolution of trademark protection
of slogans started as early as 1970 in the famous case Roux Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc. 108 Clairol attempted to register the slo-
gan "HAIR COLOR SO NATURAL ONLY HER HAIRDRESSER
KNOWS FOR SURE" on the principal register for hair color prod-
ucts. 10 9 Roux, a competitor, opposed the registration of Clairol's slo-
gan, and asserted that the slogan was merely descriptive, incapable
of functioning as a trademark, and that registration would usurp lan-
guage that could be used by Roux or others in the hair color
industry. 10
The court assumed the slogan was "descriptive" of the goods,1"1
but stated that in order to determine whether the slogan was
"merely descriptive," the court needed to "ascertain the reaction of
those to whom [the slogan] . . . [was] directed-the consumers."11 2
Rather than question the "ingenuity" or "alliteration" of the slogan,
the court at last focused on whether the slogan functioned as a
trademark.' The answer to this question was "yes." Clairol sub-
mitted strong circumstantial evidence from which the court inferred
that the slogan acquired secondary meaning in the eyes of consum-
ers.' 1 4 The court also found that Roux and other competitors did not
106. Id. at 907.
107. Id. at 907-8. This author believes the opinion is overly concise.
108. Roux Laboratories, Inc. v. Clairol Inc., 427 F.2d 823 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
109. Id. at 824.
110. Id. Roux asserted the prior use in advertising of various fragments of the
slogan for describing Roux's products and expressed fear that registration would
enable Clairol to harrass competitors who use similar descriptive phrases. Id.
111. Id. at 826.
112. 427 F.2d at 825 (cites omitted).
113. Id. at 825-31.
114. Id. at 824-25. Applicant submitted evidence of an extensive advertising
campaign that cost Clairol over twenty-two million dollars. The court considered
such factors as the amount of money spent on advertising, the repeated use of the
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need the entire slogan to describe features of their products, having
used similar descriptive expressions in the past. 5
In 1974 the CCPA relied on Roux in permitting registration on
the principal register of "WE PRINT-IT IN A MIN-IT" as part of a
service mark for copying services." 6 The court noted that "[t]he
slogan is a rhyming couplet and distinctive in its use of hyphens in
'PRINT-IT' and 'MIN-IT' and the misspelling of the latter."' 17 The
solicitor suggested the court disregard the special misspelling and
hyphenation and consider only the sound of the slogan, "we print it
in a minute," to show the slogan merely described the applicant's
printing services." 1s A misspelling of a word will not generally turn
a descriptive word into a non-descriptive mark. 1 9 The court, how-
ever, held the slogan was not merely descriptive of the printing
services and ignored the contention that other copying services
would be likely to advertise that they, too, can "print it in a
minute."'12
0
The following year the CCPA expressed language strongly sup-
porting the treatment of slogans in the same manner as conventional
marks.' 2 ' Marriott Corporation filed for registration of the slogan
slogan, enormous sales figures, and estimates of the number (in millions) of people
who received audio and visual impressions of the advertising (how many people
the advertising reached). Id. From this circumstantial evidence, the court found
"applicant has so extensively promoted its slogan that it must have made some im-
pact on the purchasing public as an indication of origin." Id. at 827 (emphasis in
original). Circumstantial evidence may be used to prove the state of mind of buy-
ers. 1 J.T. McCAwr~y, TaDnmmucs AND UNPvm, CompmrioN § 15:10 (2d ed. 1984).
115. 427 F.2d at 829. Roux has used the following quotes in its advertising:
"only you and your hairdresser know where nature stopped and Roux began" and
"so matches nature's look that no one knows it's there!" Id. at 824, n.3. Clairol
only owns the slogan, itself, and the policy of fair use does not always give Clairol
the right to stop a competitor from using certain words in the slogan; only infring-
ing use of a substantially similar slogan can be enjoined. See supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
116. In re Kopy Kat, Inc., 498 F.2d 1379 (C.C.P.A. 1974) The service mark
consisted in its entirety of a large drawing of two cats, one holding papers and the
other holding envelopes. Above the cats is "KOPY KAT" in very large letters. The
slogan "WE PRINT-IT IN A MIN-IT" is in smaller print below the cats. Id. at 1380.
117. Id. at 1381.
118. Id.
119. See 1 J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 116, § 11:12, at 460. The court neither
explicitly rejected nor accepted the solicitor's contention regarding the misspell-
ing. Later in the decision, though, the court acknowledged the misspelling as a
relevant factor. Kopy Kat, 498 F.2d at 1381-82.
120. 498 F.2d at 1381. The court cited numerous cases where registration of
slogans was permitted such as the Enka decision, Redmond and Roux (cites omit-
ted). However, in each of these cases, these descriptive slogans had been regis-
tered on the basis of very strong evidence of secondary meaning. Moreover, New
York City copy shops frequently devote advertising space to describing the speed
of their copying services. Therefore, this decision may have been too liberal.
121. In re Marriott Corp., 517 F.2d 1364 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
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"WE SMILE MORE" as a service mark 122 for its hotel and restaurant
services.' 23 In opposition to many earlier court views, the court
here asserted, "[u]niqueness is not a necessary characteristic of a
slogan serving as a trademark."' 124 The court admitted the slogan
was a common ordinary expression, however, and found the slogan
suggestive of ". . . the facial expression of persons performing the
services [rather than descriptive of the] services themselves."' 125
The court specifically noted that even where marks are descriptive,
upon determining distinctiveness, marks ... must be considered in
their entireties."' 1 26
In 1979 the Board cited the language of the Marriott decision and
took it a step further; "a slogan or expression does not neccessarily
have to be unique or catchy or rhyming to perform the function of a
mark."' 127 The applicant's attempt to register the slogan "THINK
ABOUT IT" as a service mark for banking and financial servic..s
failed, 128 but not because of any anti-slogan attitude of the Board.
On the contrary, the Board confidently stated "[tihere can be no
doubt that slogans are registrable on the Principal Register when
they" function as a trademark.'12 9 The Board denied registration af-
ter a careful analysis of the specimens which led to their conclusion
that, in this case, consumers would only consider the ordinary mean-
ing of the slogan and would not view the slogan as distinctive of the
applicant's services.13 0
The Board used this reasoning again in 1988 when it denied re-
gistration of the slogan "HI-YO-SILVER" on the principal register
"as a trademark for cinematographic films, audio and video tapes,
cassettes and cartridges, and viewers for use with photographic
transparency slides."' 3' Applicant acknowledged the coined na-
122. "The function of a service mark is to indicate continuity of quality of serv-
ices, i.e., that the quality of services rendered in connection with a particular mark
is controlled by a single entity." Id. at 1368.
123. Id. Marriott asserts use of the mark by its predecessor in title since 1964 on
lapel buttons pinned to employees' uniforms, such pins supplied nationally to cus-
tomers and potential customers. Id. at 1366. The court held the evidence of use
was minimal, but still substantial enough to show the slogan indicated a single
source of the services to consumers.
124. Id. at 1368; see The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
125. 517 F.2d at 1368.
126. Id. (quoting Magnavox Co. v. Multivox Corp. of America, 341 F.2d 139
(1965)).
127. In re European American Bank & Trust Co., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 788
(T.T.A.B. 1979).
128. Id. Applicant claimed use for three years prominently displayed in adver-
tisements directly underneath the name European American Bank in bold black
letters. Applicant asserted the slogan was "a fanciful phoenetic rhythm," and was
distinctive and unique. Id. at 789.
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 789-90.
131. In re Southbrook Entertainment Corp., 8 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1166 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
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ure of the slogan, its extensive use for fifty years in "Lone Ranger"
radio shows and comic strips, and its close link to the "Lone Ranger"
character. 132 The Board, however, looked to the ".... use of the
term as evidenced by the specimens of record," and found the slo-
gan, although distinctive of the character, did not function as a
trademark to indicate Southbrook Entertainment as the source of the
videocassettes.13 3 Although the slogan was exclaimed by the Lone
Ranger character at the beginning of each videocassette episode
and the slogan appeared at the bottom of the screen, the Board
held that consumers would view the slogan as nothing more than an
expression of the character. 134
The Board reiterated the logic of its Southbrook decision when it
cancelled Anheuser-Busch's (respondent) registration of "THE
ORIGINAL PARTY ANIMAL" as a trademark for respondent's
beer.135 Owen Ryan (petitioner) filed to register "PARTY ANI-
MALS" as a mark for crackers and was opposed by respondent.13 6
Petitioner then petitioned to cancel the registration owned by re-
spondent on grounds that the slogan did not function as a trademark
for respondent's goods (beer).' 3 7 The Board held that "THE ORIGI-
NAL PARTY ANIMAL," featured as a slogan beside the now-famous
promotional character "Spuds Mackenzie" on the ad and the dis-
plays used to promote respondent's beer was only descriptive of the
character "Spuds Mackenzie" and was not disinctive of respondent's
goods.1 38 Th4 slogan never stood alone in the beer ads, but was
only used in conjunction with the "Spuds Mackenzie" character.
The public would not perceive the slogan as indicating the source
132. Id. at 1166-67.
133. Id. at 1167.
134. Id. The Board contrasted this case with the MGM Lion which roars at the
beginning of each MGM film and indicates to viewers that the film was produced
by MGM. The slogan exclaimed by the Lone Ranger character, on the other hand,
does not indicate that Southbrook Entertainment produced the films nor manufac-
tured them. Id. at 1167-69.
135. Owen Ryan & Assocs. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., Cancellation No. 17,939 slip
op. (May 16, 1990), vacated and remanded with instruction to dismiss with preju-
dice on other grounds (T.T.A.B. February 20, 1991). This unreported decision was
vacated by consent of both parties pursuant to a settlement agreement. Respon-
dent's slogan was registered as a trademark for Budweiser Beer and Bud Lite Beer.
136. Id. at 1-2.
137. Id. at 1. Petitioner claimed "the continued existence of said registration
stands as a potential cloud on the right to register 'PARTY ANIMALS' by Peti-
tioner." Id.
138. Id. at 11-12. Respondent submitted specimens of displays associated with
the goods. These displays show a large dog, the words "Spuds Mackenzie," and
directly underneath, the slogan "THE ORIGINAL PARTY ANIMAL." In each dis-
play, the beer Bud Light is shown, however, the beer is not in close proximity to the
slogan. The slogan only modifies the character name. Id. at 10-11. Respondent
also submitted printed articles about the character Spuds Mackenzie who is re-
ferred to in the articles as "THE ORIGINAL PARTY ANIMAL.". Id. at 11, n.5.
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of the beer, and thus, did not function as a trademark for the
beer. 139
The Board unabashedly expressed the liberal approach of the
fourth stage in a 1985 case."" The National Training Center for Lie
Detection published The Journal of Polygraphic Science with the
title printed in very large bold type across the cover of the periodi-
cal. "' The slogan "DEDICATED TO ACHIEVING THE HIGHEST
LEVEL OF PROFESSIONALISM" was printed in the upper right
hand corner of the cover in extremely small type. 4 2 The court pro-
vided an interesting rationale for granting registration on the princi-
pal register for the slogan: "[b]ecause we have not been persuaded
that applicant's admittedly laudatory phrase... does not function as
a mark, we believe that the asserted mark does so function and
should be allowed for publication." 14 ' The heavy burden of proof
placed upon the applicant had shifted completely in the other direc-
tion. Applicant presented neither exhibits nor promotional materi-
als, nor affidavits attesting to recognition of the slogan as a mark. 144
The Board stated, "[t]he ultimate test is what the customers (subscrib-
ers and readers in this case) understand by the phrase from the
manner and context of use.""" This determination was made with
reference only to samples of the journal at issue. No other proof was
requested. 148
This liberal attitude was also exemplified by the Board in a 1986
case. 147 There, the Board permitted the applicant to register
"AMERICA'S BEST CHEW" on the principal register because it ac-
quired secondary meaning through extensive use on packaging and
in advertising for over thirty years. 14 8 This seems unusual in light of
the history of similar slogans. Just two years before this decision, the
Carvel Corporation was denied registration on the supplemental
register for the slogan "AMERICA'S FRESHEST ICE CREAM." 149
The Board held Carvel's slogan was merely a common, laudatory
mark that was incapable of indicating origin to the purchasing pub-
lic.' 50 The Board distinguished "AMERICA'S BEST CHEW" from
139. Id. at 12.
140. In re National Training Center of Lie Detection, Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. 798
(T.T.A.B. 1985).
141. Id. at 799.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 800.
144. 226 U.S.P.Q. at 799.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Taylor Bros. Inc. v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 412
(T.T.A.B. 1986).
148. Id.
149. In re Carvel Corp., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65 (T.T.A.B.1984).
150. Id. at 67. (Citing the Burmel decision for the proposition that a purely laud-
atory expression cannot function as a trademark, regardless of extensive use). See
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"AMERICA'S FRESHEST ICE CREAM" because "the word 'chew' is
[not] synonymous with 'chewing tobacco'" and "... . the generic or
common descriptive name of the goods is not part of the slogan."151
The BoLrd concluded that since the slogan has not been proven un-
registrable, it is registrable."5 2 Although the Board distinguished
these cases, it is highly doubtful that such a conclusion would have
been reached twenty years earlier.
CONCLUSION
The slogan has endured a long struggle in its effort to be treated
with the same respect as other marks. The questions of ingenuity,
uniqueness, and rhyme have fallen by the wayside. The PTO does
not sponsor a contest to see who can write the catchiest slogan.
Rather, today, a slogan is registrable if it functions as a trademark or
is capable of functioning as a trademark and if no evidence proves
otherwise.
Evynne Grover
Burmel, supra note 68. See, e.g., In re Melville Corp., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 970
(T.T.A.B. 1986) (refusing registration of slogan "BRAND NAMES FOR LESS" for
retail clothing store services because it was incapable of indicating source regard-
less of the millions of dollars spent advertising the slogan and the billions of dollars
in sales).
151. 231 U.S.P.Q. at 414-15.
152. Id.
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